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Introduction
The Dakota Proposition, an initiated proposal to amend the South Dakota State
Constitution, will appear on the 1980 ballot.
far reaching implications.

The Proposition would seem to have

Yet , what are these implications?

Will the Proposition

be a boon to taxpayers, a calamity for government, or both?
Three major provisions are included in the Proposition.
I.

These are:

A reduction or rollback of taxes on real property to one percent of Full and

True value, determined by assessments performed in 1977;
2.

A ceiling of two percent annual growth in the Full and True value of real

property for any year during which inflation exceeds two percent.

Inflation would

be measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), an official calculation of general
consumer price changes in the U.S. economy;
3.

A two-thirds vote requirement for both houses of the state legislature on

any tax increases, and specific prohibition of legislative changes in real property
taxes or of a tax on the sale of real property.
This paper involves an examination of the likely economic impacts and implications of the first two major provisions, the rollback and the ceiling on growth
of the bases, and additional analyses to assist readers in making informed decisions
about the Dakota Proposition.
Rollback Provision
Figures f rom the South Dakota Department of Revenue reveal that real property
taxes payable in 1978 (including taxes on utility property) were approximately $195. 9
million.1 If the Dakota Proposition had been in effect in 1978, however, taxes on
real property would have been limited to one percent of the Full and True value as
assessed in 1977.

Instead of paying $195.9 million in taxes on real property , real

property owners would have paid approximately $95.6 million, a savings for taxpayers

lAnnual Statistical Report FY 1978, South Dakota Depar �ent of Revenue,
Pierre, p. 28.

-2and a revenue loss for local governments of about $100 million or more than fifty
percent. 2
Over the past five years, property taxes in South Dakota have increased at an
average annual rate of seven percent.

If property taxes were to continue to in-

crease at the same rate, by 1981 (the proposed year for initiating the Dakota
Proposition), real property taxes would total approximately $240 million.

The

Dakota Proposition would, however, rollback real property taxes to about $101.5
million, creating a reduction in tax revenues of $138.5 million or about 58 percent.3
of the Rollback
Agricultural and non-agricultural properties in South Dakota are treated distinctly for purposes of taxation to support elementary and secondary schools.

The

first eight mills required to fund local school budgets are applied equally to
agricultural and non-agricultural properties; for rates above eight mills, nonagricultural land is taxed at two mills for every one mill on agricultural property ,
up to a ceiling of twenty four mills for agricultural and forty mills for non-agricultural property.4
In effect, non-agricultural properties are, in general, taxed at a higher
percentage of their assessed value.

But again, the Dakota Proposition would limit

the rate of taxation to one percent of Full and True value without respect to agricultural non-agricultural differences.

This limit has two related consequences--

2.california's experience with Proposition 13 suggests that an ex� legal
challenge to the Full and True assessments of 1977 might, however, arise. Such a
challenge would involve an attempt to raise Full and True assessments to reflect
actual market values. If the Full and True values for 1977 are adjusted by the
average assess�ent to sales ratio for South Dakota in 1977 (79.7%) the values in
crease by twenty percent. Thus real property taxes (excluding utilities) would have
been rolled back to $116 million, rather than $95.6 million. Taxpayers would have
saved $63.7 million and local units of government would have lost about thirty-five
percent of revenues from real property taxes. Sales ratio figures are from: 1977
South Dakota Assessment and Sales Information, Property Tax Division, Department of
Revenue, Pierre, South Dakota.
3This projection assumes no ex post adjustment in the Full and True value assess
ment of 1977.
4This ceiling does not apply to bond redemption levies.

-3tax savings created would be more substantial for non-agricultural real property
owners than for agricultural real property owners; and, local governments in more
urbanized counties would lose a greater percentage of their revenues than would
local governments in more agricultural counties.
Table I illustrates rollback consequences for agricultural and non-agricultural
property owners in 1978.

Had the Dakota Proposition been put into effect in 1978,

real property taxes for agricultural lands and lots would have been reduced, on the
average, by 30.0 percent.

But property taxes on non-agricultural lands and lots

would have been reduced, on the average, by 63.2 percent.
TABLE I*
Impact of Dakota Proposition:
Type of Property
Agricultural
Lands
Lots
Total
Non-agricultural
Lands
Lots
Total

Taxes Payable(S)

Ag Non-ag Property (1978)
With the Dakota
Pro.E_osition ($)

Difference ($)

Change

73,993,317
�'?_3,107
74,246,424

51,955,038

22,931,386

-30.0%

6,229,580
99,241,632
105,471,212

38,803,261

66,667,951

-63.2%

$179,717,636

$90,758,299

$88,959,337

-49.5%

* Source of data is South Dakota Department of Revenue, Annual Statistical Report,
FY 1978.

Counties with relatively more non-agricultural properties are, by definition, the
more urbanized counties of the state.

Table II lists South Dakota counties and shows

the absolute and percentage decline in annual real property tax revenues which local
governments in the counties would �ave experienced had th� Dakota Proposition taken
effect in 1978.5
tax increase.

Note that one agricultural county, Sull)·, would have experienced a

5Appendix I shows county impacts given an ex post adjr,:-,tment of Full and True value·
for 1977 using the "all average" assessment-sales ratios, by county, 1977.

TABLE II
Impact of the Dakota Prop<JSi tiun By County ( 1978)
�-�
Aurora

Beadle
Bennett
Bon Homne
Braakints

Bro\tn

Brule
Buffalo
Butte
Campbell
Charles Hix
Clark
Chy
Codington
Corson
Custer
Davison

Day
Deuel
De.,ey
Douglas
Edmunds
Fall River
Shannon
Faulk
Grant

Gregory
Baakon
Hamlin
Hand
Hanson

v

l!ardbg
Hughes
Hutchinson
Hyde
Jackson
Washabaugh
Jerauld
Jones
lingsbury
Lake

Lawrence

Lincoln
Lyi:aan

McCook

McPhci:son
Marshall
Meade
Mellette
M.inei:
Minnehaha
Moody

.Ft!un.1ng,::on

Pei:kins

Potter

Roberts
Sanborn
Spink
Stanley
Sully
Tripp
Todd
Turner
llnton
Wa lwilrth
Y.anktiln
Ziebach
!.:ital
Averagt>S
Per County

De-crease (or Inc re.ise)
1n T.J:< 'Revenut•:i {$}
429,505.77
3,496,457.27
527,28).19
l,209,70S.l2
),259,553.46
6,666,)62. 71

660,685. 77
11,558. 70
1,241,218.61
206,591.10
1,115,899.15
550,999.85
1,752,652.86
3,202,150.80
210,968.16
783.217.70
3,225,957.80
1,127,304.05
834,)45.20
197,196.)3
385,564.35
750,273.25
1,152,24).50
63,770.91
409,767.96
1,805,276.78
947,081.53
301,931.72
643,283.07
619,085.74
513,895.96
428,148.26
2,106,228.44
t,481,177.43
88,321.14
85,234. 74
2,251.95
350,670.18
331,678.61
927,833.38
1,435, 107. 79
3,930,182.92
1,711,637.69
358,742.52
895,524.04
603,610.94
572,352.73
1,579,922.58
813,401.95
550,569.35
18,914,970.36
934,293.16
12,248,521.96
126,327.27
330,767.39
1,421,977.42
524,486.31
1,127,847.73
430,453.16
(26,970.54)
795,177.41
178,%0.17
1,031,553.88
t,799,148.18
1,213,54 ) ... J
3,180.095.JS
95,693.69

Percentage �ecre�se
� Incre.,se) I�)
37
58
62
54
54
56
43
05
49
26
46
34
50
59
17
56
69
45
51
29
38
37
57
38
30
42
50
32
43
31
48
48
49
49
11
19
01
38
55
42
54
67
45
25
47
38
36
52
29
48
60
44
63
08
25
53
48
36
40

(02)

34
38
41
34
51
39
16

100,256,�82.68
1,496,365.41

41

-4.Study of Table II reveals that� in general, real property tax reductions
for IDore rural counties would have be.en less than for more urban counties.
t:her-e are -exceptions.

Yet�

Among the more rural counties of the state, for example�

Bennet County would have had a reduction of 62 percent - a greater percentage
reduction than either Minnehaha or Brown County.
A second explanation for the difference in impact among counties lies in
t:ax rate differences..

Those counties which tax property at a higher mill levey

rate would have a greater reduction in revenues with Dakota Proposition.

Two

c,ounties might even have property of equal m�Itet value and might obtain equal
tax revenues.

Yet if assessed values and mill rates differed, that county

with a lower assessed value (and higher mill rates) would be more affected by
Dakota Proposition than would the county with a higher assessed value (and
l,ower mill rates).
Thus Table II reveals that those counties �hich have the highest tax rates
(highest mill levies relative to assessed values) would be most affected by
"Dakota Proposition.

Having a high tax rate may reflect:

(1) a high proportion

of nonagricultural real property relative to agricultural property; (2) a strategy
of keeping assessments low and mill levies high; or, (3) simply a willingness to
:impose a relatively high tax rate to yield revenues for desired services.

-5Growth Ceiling Provision
A second major provision of the Dakota Proposition is the creation of a ceiling
on changes in the assessed value of real property subsequent to the Full and True
assessment of 1977.

Changes in assessed value would be tied to a measure of prices

paid by consumers, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) .
Assessed values for real property could change on an annual basis in direct
proportion to changes in CPI (either positive or negative changes) , except that if
the CPI rose by more than two percent, assessed value growth �ould be limited to two
percent only.

Since the CPI will almost inevitably rise by more than two percent

annually, for the forseeable future, this provision will efectively limit growth
in assessed real property values to less than the rate of general consumer inflation.
Prices paid for state and local government purchases in recent years have, however, been rising at a rate above the CPI.

Rapid increases in governme�t purchase

prices reflect both general inflation in the economy and supply-demand conditions
wl1ich increase the prices for particular products.

For example, government units,

as large purchasers of petroleum products, would be significantly affected by price
increases resulting from crude oil shortages.
One measure of prices paid by state and local governments is the GNP Deflator
for State and Local Purchases.

The Deflator reveals, for example, that from 1967

to 1978, prices paid by state and local governments for purchases increased by 121. 4
percent.

The CPI increase for the corresponding period of time was 95. 4 percent.

Implications of the growth ceiling provision can be v:Lewed in a series of two
graphs.

Graph #1 shows that the nominal growth in property taxes collected in South

Dakota during the period 1970 through 1977 was 55. 6 percen:.

If the Dakota Propositio�

had been in effect during that period, however, growth in property taxes would have

been limited to 14. 9 percent. 6

Nominal changes do not involve any consideration of t:;2 impact of inflation,
however,

Graph #2 incorporates the effect of inflation on tax revenues by deflating

6 Nominal per capita personal income grew in South Dako:a by 91. 7 percent during
the same period.

-6revenues through the use of the CPI.

If the change in property taxes collected

from 1970 through 1977 is calculated in 1970 dollars, so as to reveal changes the
actual purchasing power of property taxes collected, such purchasing power was reduced
by 0. 5 percent. 7 The nominal growth in property tax virtually kept pace with general
inflation so that the dollars in revenue collected in 1977 could purchase approximately
the same amount of goods in 1977 as in 1970.

1£ the Dakota Proposition had been in

effect during that period, however, the purchasing power of property taxes collected
(as adjusted by the CPI) would have declined by 41. 2 percent.
Percent
change

+50%

GROWII·I LIMITATiml' PROVISION
Graph 02:
Nominal
Percent
change
A

Graph Ul:

l

Real

+50%

-------B (+14.9%)

1970

.?:::-:.-:::::::·

19 77 ·

1970

D (-41.2%)

-50%

-50% T
A= Nominal Property Tax Collected
B � Maximum growth w/ Dakota Proposition

Cc Real Property Tax Collected
c Real 2'1axi;:ium Growth w/ Dakot.:i.
Proposition

D

Recall, however, that prices paid for purchases by state and local government

have exceeded the general rate of inflation for consumer purchases.

Thus the analysis

of the loss of purchasing power as measured by the CPI results is a conservative
estimate.

I f the change in property taxes collected between 1970 and 1977 is ad-

justed by the GNP Deflator a 12. 5 percent,decline in purchasing power is revealed.
the Dakota Proposition had been in effect during that same period, however, the purchasing power of property taxes collected (as adjusted by the GNP Deflator) would
have declined by 53. 2 percent.
7During the same period, the purchasing power of per capita personal incomes in
South Dakota increased by 22. 8 percent.

If

-7The conclusion of this analysis of the growth ceiling provision is that if,
as .expected, general inflation significantly exceeds two percent annually� this
provision would create a significant and continuous decline in the purchasing power
of the real property tax in South Dakota.

Any price increases over and above general

lnflation for purchases made by state and local governments would further reduce the
purchasing power of the property tax.
Additional Implications of the Pro2osition

A number of additional implications of the Dakota Proposition exist--both for
the :public and private sectors.
.Public Sector--State and Local
7he passage of Proposition 13 in California in 1978 resulted in massive state aid
to local governments.

Such aid is unlikely in South Dakota, given the minimal state

surplus and the estimated size of the rollback amount relative to the total state budget.
:Marked jncreases in state aid would requjxe additional state taxes.
At the local government level, elementary and secondary schools will be the
'l!Ilits of government most adversely affected by reductions in property tax revenues.
7able TII revels that the 1978 property tax was distributed in such a way that primary
.and secondary schools received almost two thirds of the revenues obtained.

Moreover,

schools in South Dakota obtain approximately 70 percent of their finances from the
local property tax, so that the quantity and quality of primary and secondary education&"
services depend heavily on property tax revenues.
Table III
Tiistribution of South Dakota Property Tax Revenues (1978)
Local Government Units
Schools
Counties
Cities and Towns
Townships and Sp. Districts
Source:

Department of Revenue Annual Report FY 1978, p. �··

Percent

63.11
20.61
13.89
2.39
100.00

-8Schools also do not have the ability to charge user fees or to enact new taxes.
General purpose governments, in contrast, would have the ability and the incentive,
given property tax reductions, to charge or increase fees for goods and services
such as trash collection, water, building inspection, parks, sewage disposal, etc.
Cities in South Dakota would also have the incentive and the ability, with voter
approval, to enact or to increase municipal sales taxes.
Private Sector
Additional implications in the private sector may be traced as well.

Land owners

would be more likely to construct or repair homes and other improvements since the
disincentive to improving property created by the property tax would be lessened.
Current land owners would reap the windfall of the roll back and the expected
reduction in future property taxes.

The windfall could be taken either as a reduced

tax burden with continued ownership or capitalized into the sales price of property.
Passage of the Dakota Proposition, other things equal, would mean that prices for
land would tend to increase.

Prices for homes and other imporvements are likely to

rise initially, then decline again as increased supplies of capital drive prices
dovmward.
Purchasers of services provided by investor-owned utilities would likely find
their monthly bills for electricity, gas, or telephone had fallen.

Regulated utilities

have rates set relative to their costs of business so that decreased taxes are likely
to be passed along as decreased rates for consumers.
Values and Trade-Offs
Values, our sense of the goodness and badness of pers�,1s, events, and things,
will influence our decisions about the Dakota Proposition End about taxation and
government activities in general.

It is important to recornize that the decision

about how to react to the Dakota Proposition and to taxati0 a and government in South
Dakota can involve an objective examination of our own vnLes and the values of others. 2
8By an objective examinntion is meant one that is cohc �nt and clear, one open to
critique by others, and one which results in decisions whi :i appear to have been right.

-9Burdensome Nature of Property Tax
Two corrnnonly held values are likely to prompt citizens to support the Dakota
Proposition.

First, some citizens may regard the property tax in South Dakota as

too burdensome.

Indeed, statistics may be cited to support this view.

Dakota in 1975, for example:

In South

the property tax was $57 per $1000 of personal income,

placing the state seventh among all states; the property tax was $491 per $1000 of
state and local revenue (fifth among all states); state aid was $249 per $1000 of
local revenue (!-.8th among all states and thereby implying that other states rely
relatively more on sales and income taxes); state and local taxes were $116 per
$1000 income (29th among all states and implying that the total tax burden was not
unusual in South Dakota even while the dependence on the property tax was unusually
high).9

But although the Dakota Proposition would significantly reduce the property
tax burden in South Dakota, other potential consequences should also be considered.
For that individual who holds the view that the property tax is too burdensome,
these other potential consequences are likely to be regarded as undesirable.

These

consequences would becowe trade-offs if the individual decided to support the Proposition.
Approval of the Dakota Proposition would increa3e the probabili0: (not make
inevitable) some combination of a loss of local control, a loss of desired programs
or levels of services, or an addition to state taxes.
Consider first the probability of a loss of local control.

If state and national

governments are called upon to suppo.rt local government uni.ts which have sustained
9All statistics were gatherd from ''Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism,
1976-77 Edition: Vol. II Revenue and Debt," Advisory Commission in Intergovernmental
Relations, Washington, D.C. 20575, March 1977. Elimination of approximately one
fifth of the property tax through the personal property tax repeal will reduce the
burden of the total property tax per se.

-10substantial revenue losses, that support is likely to involve guidelines, requirements, and other "strings" on how money may be spent.

Moreover, substantial aid

from the state could not be made without a new state tax program--probably an income
tax; the only common and major tax method not used in the state.
If, in contrast, local governments attempt to sustain very large reductions in
revenues without assistance from the state, the quantity or quality of some programs
such as elementary and secondary education would be jeopardized.

Although the

Dakota Proposition, if passed would rollback real property tax revenues to approximately the 1969 level, general inflation as measured by the CPI has reduced the
value of the 1979 dollar to only about half of the 1969 dollar; purchasing power

of revenues is greatly reduced.10The argument, sometimes heard, that passage of the

Dakota Proposition would only result in a reduction of local services back to the
1969 level ignores inflation and the decrease in revenue purchasing power subsequent to
1969.

Inequity of the Property Tax
A second value behind the move to approve t:he Dakota Proposition may well be

the belief that the property tax is an inequitable tax.

If ability of pay is measured

by income, the property tax is not necessarily tied to ability to pay� 11 A common

example used by those who hold that the property tax is inequitable is the retiree
whose income is reduced by retirement but whose property tax remains at the same level.
The property tax may also tax equal income earners uneg�ally.

Two neighbors

with equal incomes but with different consumption patterns are likely to be taxed
unequally--that individual who prefers to own real property would likely pay more
property tax than that individual who prefers to own persor�_:31 property.
lOMoreover, the cost of education and other publically vrovided services, tends
to rise relatively faster than the prices of other goods because cost reducing
technologic;al innovations are less prevelant in education o,.· other public
services than in goods in general.
11some would measure ability to pay by wealth. Since �.e property tax is a tax
on wealth held in cert�in kinds of property, the real property tax would be tied
to the ability to pay if ability were measured by wealth.

-11Finally, the property tax often is not tied to benefits received.

Through

tax contributions to public education, for example, families with real property but

2
without children help subsidize famili.es with children. 1

For those individuals, however, who support the Dakota Proposition because they
hold the view that the property tax is inequitable, some likely trade-offs resulting
from passage of the proposition should be considered.

If local public programs

reduced by the loss of local revenues, those reductions may themselves result in
what some would view as inequities.

Quantity or quality of educational programs,

assistance to the needy, and programs for the elderly might all be threatened.

More-

over, if program reductions are avoided by the passage of new tax measures, those
new sales taxes, income taxes, or user charges will not necessarily be more equitable
than the property tax itself.
Conclusion
The so-called "tax payer rebellion, " a movement which has taken on national
dimensions, is manifesting itself in South Dako�a in proposals such as the D2kota
Proposition and various other attempts to limit or reduce taxpayer outgo and government
income.

Such proposals create the opportunity and indeed the responsibility to reexamin

what the state and local governments do and how government is financed in South Dakota.
Our state has a unique tax system--one that is heavily dependent on the local
property tax, one that involves relatively small contributions from the state to
local governments, and one that does not utilize a major tax option--the state income tax.

Tax systems require reevaluation as social and economic conditions change.

Should government services in South Dakota be reduced?
tax option?

Should counties have a sales

Should the state have an income tax to reduce the property tax burden

12 It should be noted, however, that many local public services, including education,
create benefits which extend beyond the direct recipients of those services. For
example, public education creates benefits not only for a child and his family, but
for the whole community, through a better educated populace.

-12and/or increase support for local governmental units such as schools?

Should the

property tax be redesigned so that limits are placed on amounts of tax liability
relative to personal income?

These questions are ours to answer as citizens of this

state because ultimately, the quality of government decisions is dependent upon our
willingness to be informed and involved.

